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1.  CONTINUISM AND DISCONTINUISM  
ABOUT MENTAL TIME TRAVEL
Over the last several decades, the psychology of memory has undergone a major 
reorientation away from earlier conceptions of episodic memory as a specialized 
system dedicated to the storage and retrieval of information about the “what, when, 
and where” of past events and toward a conception of episodic remembering as a 
form of constructive mental time travel (MTT). Reinforced by impressive brain 
imaging evidence and extensive research on representational and phenomenologi-
cal overlap between remembering the past and imagining the future (for recent 
reviews, see Klein, 2013; Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010), this new conception 
emphasizes the deep similarities between episodic memory, future- oriented men-
tal time travel (FMTT), and, increasingly, processes such as episodic counterfac-
tual thinking (De Brigard, 2014; De Brigard & Gessell, Chapter 8 of this volume; 
Pezzulo, Chapter 13 of this volume), in which the subject imagines alternatives to 
past events. Taking the new conception to its logical conclusion, many have argued 
that, rather than distinct faculties of episodic remembering and imagining, what 
we in fact have is “a single general faculty of mental time travel” (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). On this view, remembering the past and imagining the future are 
strictly continuous.
Philosophers have recently begun to take note of the turn toward MTT in psy-
chology and, in line with older and more general philosophical suspicions about the 
ability of imagination to give us knowledge of future events, to push back against 
the associated “continuist” view. “Discontinuism,” as we may refer to this emerging 
position, maintains that, notwithstanding the strength of the empirical support 
for continuism, there are fundamental metaphysical and/ or epistemological differ-
ences between episodic memory and FMTT, differences in virtue of which it would 
be a mistake to view our capacities to remember the past and imagine the future 
as being merely special cases of a general capacity for MTT. This chapter aims to 
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meet discontinuists on their own ground, providing a philosophical defense of con-
tinuism against discontinuist arguments. The chapter argues that, while treating 
episodic memory as a form of MTT not distinct in kind from FMTT requires us 
to abandon certain common philosophical views about memory and imagination, 
there are good philosophical reasons to abandon these views and therefore to reject 
the view that there are fundamental discontinuities between episodic memory and 
future- oriented MTT. The picture that emerges of a fully symmetrical ability to 
mentally travel backward and forward in time suggests that philosophers would do 
well to follow the lead of psychologists, attending more closely than they have his-
torically done to our capacity for future- directed episodic thought and to the ways 
in which that capacity gives rise to knowledge of future events.
1.1.  Forms of Continuism and Discontinuism
Let us begin by fixing terms. Discontinuists maintain that, in addition to their dis-
tinct temporal orientations, there are further important differences between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT and that, in virtue of these further differences, episodic 
memory and FMTT amount to qualitatively different processes or states. As Debus 
puts it, “[episodic memories] of past events and [episodic imaginations] of future 
events are ultimately mental occurrences of two different kinds” (2014, 337).1 On 
the discontinuist view, it is a mistake to see MTT as a single, unified capacity that 
can be directed at either the past or the future. Continuists, in contrast, maintain 
that MTT is precisely such a unified capacity. On the continuist view, temporal 
orientation is the only important difference between episodic memory and FMTT.
Three further distinctions— between extreme and moderate, narrow and broad, 
and metaphysical and epistemological forms of (dis)continuism— will help to struc-
ture the following discussion.
1.1.1.  Extreme and Moderate Discontinuism
Perrin (who introduced the terms continuism and discontinuism in Chapter 3 of this 
volume) distinguishes between extreme and moderate forms of (dis)continuism. 
Extreme continuism denies the existence of any difference, beyond subjective tem-
poral orientation, between episodic memory and FMTT. Moderate continuism, in 
turn, acknowledges that there may be limited differences between them, but denies 
that these are sufficiently important to give rise to a difference in kind between the 
processes. Extreme discontinuism maintains that the differences between episodic 
memory and FMTT are so dramatic that they represent completely different kinds 
of process, incapable of being subsumed under a common superordinate kind. 
Moderate discontinuism, in turn, acknowledges that they may have enough features 
in common for us to classify them as belonging to a common kind, but insists that 
the differences between them are sufficiently important for them to constitute dis-
tinct kinds of process within that broader kind.
We are thus faced with a spectrum of possible positions, ranging from extreme 
continuism to extreme discontinuism. Which of these positions should we take 
seriously? As Perrin suggests, someone who holds a simple “replay” view of mem-
ory, combined with a view of FMTT as a constructive or simulational process, 
might endorse extreme discontinuism. It is unlikely that anyone now holds such a 
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combination of views, and we may thus set extreme discontinuism aside. Similarly, 
disregarding occasional rhetorical excesses, it is unlikely that anyone subscribes to 
extreme continuism, since the fact that there are a variety of differences, at the neu-
ral, representational, and phenomenological levels, between remembering the past 
and imagining the future, is now well established; we may thus set extreme con-
tinuism aside. The real debate, then, is between moderate continuism and moderate 
discontinuism: everyone will agree that there are some important similarities and 
some important dissimilarities between episodic memory and FMTT; the question 
is whether the dissimilarities are merely a matter of degree, or whether they reflect 
a qualitative difference between the two processes.
1.1.2.  Narrow and Broad Discontinuism
The debate between continuists and discontinuists focuses on the contrast between 
FMTT and episodic memory, but episodic memory is only one form of past- 
oriented mental time travel (PMTT), which also includes processes such as epi-
sodic counterfactual thought. Thus we can distinguish between narrow and broad 
forms of (moderate) discontinuism. Narrow discontinuism maintains that, in addi-
tion to their distinct temporal orientations, there are further qualitative differ-
ences between FMTT and episodic memory, remaining silent about other forms of 
PMTT. Broad discontinuism maintains that, in addition to their distinct temporal 
orientations, there are further qualitative differences between FMTT and PMTT 
as a whole, including, but not limited to, episodic memory. (Continuism is always 
broad: given that we admit that episodic memory is continuous with FMTT, there 
would seem to be no reason to maintain that other forms of PMTT are not continu-
ous with FMTT.)
The explicitly discontinuist arguments that have been offered in the literature 
are best understood as arguments for narrow discontinuism. As we will see, this 
is an important weak point, shared by a number of otherwise distinct arguments. 
Discontinuists single out episodic memory and argue for a distinction in kind 
between it and FMTT. But what are we to say about other forms of PMTT? The 
discontinuist is faced with a choice. Either he groups other forms of PMTT with 
episodic memory, or he groups them with FMTT. If they are grouped with epi-
sodic memory, narrow discontinuism collapses into broad discontinuism. If they 
are grouped with FMTT, narrow discontinuism maintains not only that there are 
qualitative discontinuities between episodic memory and FMTT but also that there 
are qualitative discontinuities within PMTT, between episodic memory and other 
forms of PMTT. Neither of these positions is easy to maintain. In the case of the 
latter position, while it is somewhat plausible to contrast episodic memory with 
FMTT, it is much less plausible to contrast episodic memory with episodic coun-
terfactual thought and other forms of PMTT; narrow discontinuism tends to lead 
to broad discontinuism. The former position (broad continuism), however, is itself 
an unstable position, as it is not particularly plausible to contrast PMTT as a whole 
with FMTT; grouping other forms of PMTT with episodic memory thus tends to 
lead us simply to adopt full- blown (moderate) continuism.
1.1.3.  Metaphysical and Epistemological Discontinuism
A final distinction is between metaphysical and epistemological forms of (dis)con-
tinuism. The distinction between metaphysics and epistemology aligns roughly 
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with the difference between descriptive questions about the mind (studied by phi-
losophers of mind) and normative questions about knowledge (studied by episte-
mologists). Thus metaphysical discontinuism accepts (and metaphysical continuism 
rejects) the existence of descriptive differences in kind between episodic memory 
and FMTT. For example, a view on which episodic memory has concrete past 
events as its objects, whereas FMTT has abstract types of possible future events as 
its objects, would amount to a form of metaphysical discontinuism (see section 2.2). 
Correspondingly, epistemological discontinuism accepts (and epistemological con-
tinuism rejects) the existence of differences in kind between the knowledge of past 
events that is provided by episodic memory and the knowledge of future events that 
is provided by FMTT. For example, a view on which certain kinds of misrepresenta-
tion are possible in remembering the past but not in imagining the future would 
amount to a form of epistemological discontinuism (see section 3.3).
Section 2 of this chapter discusses metaphysical continuism; section 3 discusses 
epistemological continuism. Which combinations of these metaphysical and epis-
temological views are coherent? Epistemological discontinuism presupposes meta-
physical discontinuism, in the sense that, if metaphysical discontinuism turns out 
to be incorrect, it is unclear what motivation might remain for epistemological 
discontinuism. Thus, if we could be certain that the arguments given in section 2 
were successful, we could in principle omit any discussion of the arguments of sec-
tion 3. But given that the former arguments are not decisive, it is worth exploring 
independent arguments for epistemological discontinuism. While epistemologi-
cal discontinuism seems to presuppose metaphysical discontinuism, metaphysi-
cal discontinuism does not entail epistemological discontinuism— there might in 
principle be qualitative differences between episodic memory and FMTT at the 
descriptive level that fail to translate into differences at the normative level. Thus 
one might in principle endorse metaphysical discontinuism while also endorsing 
epistemological continuism.
Before proceeding, a note on where this chapter fits into the wider literature: the 
strategy of the chapter is primarily negative, in that it defends continuism by 
responding to arguments for discontinuism. The positive empirical case for meta-
physical continuism has been made in the psychological literature discussed earlier; 
a positive philosophical case for metaphysical continuism is made in Michaelian 
(2016). Supposing that the main arguments of this chapter— negative arguments 
against metaphysical and epistemological discontinuism— are successful, what is 
missing at this stage is a positive case for epistemological continuism; the final sec-
tion of the chapter briefly sketches such a case, but this remains an important area 
for future work.
1.2.  Empirical Evidence and A Priori Arguments
There is a danger that philosophers and psychologists debating the continuity or dis-
continuity of episodic memory and FMTT will talk past each other. Psychologists 
endorse continuism primarily on the basis of empirical evidence for similarities 
between episodic memory and other forms of MTT. Philosophers endorse discon-
tinuism primarily on the basis of arguments of a largely conceptual character. Can 
empirical evidence decide between continuism and discontinuism? Are purely 
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conceptual arguments relevant to a debate over distinctions among kinds of men-
tal processes?
1.2.1.  The Relevance of Empirical Evidence
The general thrust of MTT research— which has demonstrated extensive similari-
ties between episodic memory and FMTT— clearly favors continuism. As Perrin 
points out, however, the MTT literature also includes a number of empirical find-
ings concerning differences between episodic memory and FMTT at both the neu-
ral and the representational levels.2
A discontinuist might be tempted to invoke these findings in support of her view, 
but there are two difficulties involved in doing so. The first difficulty is that if the 
observed differences were to suggest deep or extensive asymmetries between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT, they might in principle support discontinuism, but in 
practice they amount to differences of degree and are therefore compatible with 
continuism. At the neural level, the discontinuist might cite the fact that brain 
imaging has revealed the involvement in FMTT of brain regions that are not 
involved, or are involved to a lesser extent, in episodic memory (see, e.g., Szpunar 
et al., 2007). Philosophers with no special expertise on brain imaging ought to defer 
to psychologists and neuroscientists on the interpretation of this sort of evidence, 
and this chapter will not discuss these findings in any detail. It is sufficient here to 
note that the consensus among psychologists and neuroscientists (e.g., Schacter & 
Addis, 2007) is that the findings in question suggest differences of degree, rather 
than differences in kind, between episodic memory and FMTT, perhaps reflecting 
the greater processing demands of the latter. They thus provide little support for 
discontinuism.
At the representational level, one typical finding— echoing Hume’s (1739) argu-
ment that memory is distinguished from imagination by its greater vivacity— is that 
episodic remembering produces representations containing greater sensory and con-
textual detail than is contained by those produced by FMTT (e.g., D’Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2004). These representational- level differences might seem to pro-
vide a more promising basis for drawing a qualitative distinction between episodic 
memory and FMTT, but here, too, the differences ultimately seem to be a matter 
of degree, rather than kind. Reid (1764)— responding to Hume— remarked that he 
“would gladly know … how one degree of vivacity fixes the existence of the object 
to the present moment; another carries it back to time past; a third, taking a con-
trary direction, carries it into futurity; and a fourth carries it out of existence alto-
gether.” Translated into contemporary terms,3 Reid’s point is, roughly, that the level 
of detail of representations of both future and past events is highly variable. Both 
episodic memory and FMTT may produce more or less detailed representations, 
and, while the representations produced by episodic memory may, on average, be 
more detailed than those produced by FMTT, the difference holds only on average. 
This means that there can be no clear cutoff point above which representations 
are sufficiently detailed to count as memory representations and below which they 
are too generic to count as memory representations. Thus the observed differences 
between episodic memory and FMTT at the representational level provide little 
support for discontinuism.
The second difficulty is posed by the fact that episodic memory is not the whole 
of PMTT, which also includes processes such as episodic counterfactual thought. 
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Episodic counterfactual thought, like FMTT, calls on slightly different brain 
regions than does episodic memory (e.g., De Brigard et al., 2013) and might display 
differences at the representational level as well. If differences of this sort were to 
support a qualitative distinction between episodic memory and FMTT, they would 
presumably likewise support a similar distinction between episodic memory and 
other forms of PMTT. The discontinuist, then, can either treat the observed dif-
ferences among episodic memory, FMTT, and episodic counterfactual thought as 
irrelevant, or can opt for a form of narrow discontinuism that explicitly claims 
that episodic memory is qualitatively distinct not only from FMTT but also from 
other forms of PMTT, grouping episodic counterfactual thought with FMTT under 
the broader heading of episodic imagination. If the discontinuist takes the former 
route, he must provide alternative reasons in support of discontinuism. If he takes 
the latter route, he owes us a reason for thinking that episodic memory, in particu-
lar, should be treated as special— since the various forms of episodic cognition all 
call on slightly different brain regions, we need some additional reason for singling 
out episodic memory while treating the other processes in question as being merely 
different forms of episodic imagination. Either way, the discontinuist must fall back 
on conceptual arguments.
1.2.2.  The Status of A Priori Arguments
The chief arguments for discontinuism are indeed largely conceptual or a priori in 
character. Those of a naturalistic methodological bent— this includes many phi-
losophers, in addition to most psychologists— might therefore doubt that the threat 
from discontinuism is particularly serious, suggesting that we base our under-
standing of the relationship between remembering the past and imagining the 
future on a demonstrably productive empirical research program, rather than on 
ungrounded a priori intuitions. Indeed, since discontinuists do not deny the exis-
tence of important empirical symmetries between PMTT and FMTT, arguing, in 
many cases, for metaphysical and epistemological asymmetries that might obtain 
even if there were no empirical asymmetries whatsoever,4 naturalists might sug-
gest that the asymmetries between PMTT and FMTT with which discontinuists 
are concerned are not ones with which we should be concerned, even in principle.
Discontinuism should, however, be of interest even to those who are skeptical 
of conceptual arguments. First, while conceptual arguments go beyond empirical 
MTT research, they ought to be consistent with the main findings of that research. 
Second, as the editors point out in their Introduction to this volume, MTT research 
has proceeded at a breakneck pace that has left little time to develop the concepts 
needed to come to grips with its accumulating findings, and one potential benefit 
of engaging with philosophical resistance to the MTT framework is increased con-
ceptual clarity: when we say that remembering the past and imagining the future 
are both forms of mental time travel, alike aside from their respective temporal 
orientations, what, exactly, do (or should) we mean?
2.  AGAINST METAPHYSICAL DISCONTINUISM
This section considers arguments for metaphysical discontinuism, discuss-
ing the implications of apparent causal (section 2.1), intentional (section 2.2), 
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and phenomenological (section 2.3) discontinuities between episodic memory 
and FMTT.5
2.1.  Causal Discontinuities
In addition to the quantitative representational- level differences noted earlier, an 
argument for discontinuism might be based on more fundamental apparent inten-
tional differences between episodic memory and FMTT. One such argument is 
developed by Debus (2014), who sees intentional and causal discontinuities as inter-
twined. Debus’s case for discontinuism rests on the view that, in episodic memory, 
the subject is experientially aware of a particular past event, whereas, in FMTT, the 
subject is not (and could not be) experientially aware of a particular future event.
She summarizes the argument as follows.
1. When a subject [episodically remembers] a past event, the subject is expe-
rientially aware of a past particular event.
2. When a subject [episodically imagines] a future event, the subject could 
not possibly be experientially aware of a future particular event.
3. Being experientially aware of a particular event and being in an experien-
tial state in which one could not possibly be aware of a particular event are 
two different kinds of mental state.
4. Therefore, [episodic memories of] past events and [episodic imaginations] 
of future events are ultimately mental occurrences of two different kinds 
[i.e., metaphysical discontinuism is true].
Granting premise 3, this argument succeeds in establishing metaphysical discon-
tinuism unless either premise 1 or premise 2 is false. Premise 1 has two components. 
First, it says that, in episodic memory, the subject enjoys experiential awareness of 
past events. Call this the positive relation claim. Second, it says that, in episodic 
memory, the subject is aware of particular past events. Call this the positive object 
claim. Premise 2 likewise has two aspects. First, it says that, in FMTT, the subject 
does not enjoy experiential awareness of future events. Call this the negative rela-
tion claim. Second, it says that, in FMTT, the subject is not aware of particular 
future events. Call this the negative object claim. This section discusses the relation 
claims (the causal aspect of the argument); section 2.2 discusses the object claims 
(the intentional aspect).6
2.1.1.  The Negative Relation Claim
In support of the negative relation claim, Debus argues, first, that in order for a 
subject to be experientially aware of an event at a given time, the event must be 
“actual” “from the subject’s own spatio- temporal perspective at the time” and, sec-
ond, that future events are not actual. At first glance, this seems plausible enough. 
If experiential awareness is the kind of awareness that one has one when perceives 
an event, and if what it is for an event to be actual from the subject’s spatiotempo-
ral perspective is for it to occur at the relevant time, then premise 2 is uncontro-
versially right: one cannot be experientially aware of future events simply because 
one is not contemporaneous with them— they have not yet occurred. But if this is 
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how we understand experiential awareness, premise 1 is likewise uncontroversially 
wrong: one cannot be experientially aware of past events simply because one is not 
contemporaneous with them— they have already occurred. Thus what Debus needs 
is a notion of experiential awareness on which a subject may be experientially aware 
of an event with which she is not contemporaneous, but only when the event in 
question is located in the past, not when it is located in the future.
2.1.2.  The Positive Relation Claim
The discontinuist therefore must understand experiential awareness in a looser, less 
literal sense. And indeed, Debus ultimately suggests that what it is for one to be 
aware of a past event, in the relevant sense, is for one to have experienced the event 
when it occurred and for one’s current thought of the event to have the right sort 
of causal connection to one’s original experience of it.7 If this is what “experiential 
awareness” amounts to, then, while the label is misleading, a subject may be aware 
of an event that does not occur at the time at which he represents it, as long as he 
experienced it at the time at which it did occur. And if enjoying this sort of aware-
ness is definitive of episodic memory, then it does mark a qualitative asymmetry 
between remembering past events and imagining future events, since, even if one 
will eventually experience an event, one’s current representation of an event cannot 
be caused by one’s future experience of it. The tenability of continuism thus rests on 
the tenability of the denial of the claim that remembering requires a causal connec-
tion between the subject’s current representation of a past event and his previous 
experience of that event, a condition that is at the heart of the influential causal 
theory of memory (Martin and Deutscher, 1966).
Before discussing the causal condition, some background is in order. Philosophers 
generally take it for granted that we can meaningfully distinguish between genuine 
and merely apparent memory. As it is standardly drawn, this distinction presup-
poses two claims. The first is the semantic claim that genuine remembering is “fac-
tive,” where factivity means, in the case of semantic memory, that the content of the 
apparent memory is true or correct and, in the case of episodic memory, that the 
apparently remembered event actually occurred. If a subject seems to remember a 
proposition but the proposition is false, the apparent memory is said to be merely 
apparent. If a subject seems to remember an event but the event did not actually 
occur, the apparent memory is likewise said to be merely apparent. Factivity will be 
discussed further in section 2.2. The second claim is that, since an apparent memory 
might be accurate for the wrong sort of reason (e.g., due to blind luck), something 
more than simple correspondence between the subject’s current representation and 
the event must be required to distinguish genuine memory from merely apparent 
memory (i.e., factivity is not enough for genuine memory). Different philosophical 
theories propose different accounts of the nature of this “something more.” The 
causal theory, in particular, says that the subject’s current representation must be 
caused (in the right way)8 by her experience of the event itself.
Though it has been influential in philosophy, and though something like it may 
occasionally be presupposed in discussions of false memory in psychology, there 
is considerable empirical evidence against the causal theory, and hence the theory 
in turn can provide little support for metaphysical discontinuism. When arguing 
from empirical memory research to the conclusion that the causal theory is incor-
rect, there are two different paths that we might take.9 First, we might start from 
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the research on mental time travel discussed earlier. In outline— see Michaelian 
(2016) for a more detailed version of this argument— the strategy here would be to 
argue that the overlap that has been demonstrated between remembering the past, 
imagining the future, episodic counterfactual thought, and other forms of episodic 
cognition shows that, intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding, there is noth-
ing special about episodic memory— episodic memory is just one form of episodic 
imagination among others. Like any other form of episodic imagination, episodic 
remembering is a simulational process that draws on information originating in a 
variety of different sources to construct a representation of a target episode. Just 
as other forms of episodic imagination of necessity do not draw on any informa-
tion originating in the episodes they target (since the subject has not experienced 
those episodes), episodic memory need not draw on any information originating 
in the episodes it targets. In many cases, information originating in the subject’s 
experience of the target episode will in fact end up being incorporated into the 
subject’s memory representation of the event. In such cases, memory may ensure an 
appropriate causal connection between the memory representation and the origi-
nal experience. But even in such cases, information originating in experience of 
the target episode may represent only a small fraction of the total content of the 
memory representation; there may thus be equally strong or stronger connections 
to another episode or episodes, making the relevance of the causal connection to 
the target episode unclear. And in many other cases, no information originating in 
the subject’s experience of the target episode ends up being incorporated into the 
subject’s memory representation of the event. In such cases, memory involves no 
causal connection with the original experience whatsoever.
If this picture of episodic memory as one form of episodic imagination among 
others is right, the causal condition does not provide an adequate account of the 
“something else” distinguishing genuine from merely apparent remembering,10 
and discontinuists may not appeal to the causal theory to ground the claim that 
there is a qualitative metaphysical difference between episodic memory and FMTT. 
Discontinuists might in principle respond to this argument by drawing a distinc-
tion within episodic memory, arguing that only representations of events from the 
personal past that are produced by processes that do satisfy the causal condition 
qualify as genuine memories. This response, however, sits ill with the workings of 
the episodic construction system. There is overwhelming evidence that, while the 
system aims, within certain limits, at producing accurate representations of past 
episodes, it is simply not designed to ensure causal connections with past episodes. 
Remembering regularly fails to involve causal connections, and there is no differ-
ence, at the neurocognitive level, between (apparent) memories that do involve a 
causal connection and (apparent) memories that do not. Given that we want our 
philosophical account of remembering to correspond to a process that unfolds at 
the neurocognitive level, there is simply no justification for drawing this sort of 
distinction within episodic memory.
Situating episodic memory as a form of PMTT further undermines the causal 
condition. In addition to producing representations of episodes from the actual 
personal past, the episodic construction system frequently aims at producing 
representations of counterfactual episodes from the personal past. And while it 
may be intuitively plausible to claim that episodic memory is distinguished from 
FMTT by the fact that the former necessarily involves a causal connection with 
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the target episode, it is considerably less plausible to claim that it is distinguished 
from episodic counterfactual thought in this manner. The boundary between epi-
sodic memory and episodic counterfactual thought is fluid, in the sense that we are 
able to shift freely back and forth between (attempting to) remember events as they 
actually occurred and (attempting to) imagine them occurring in more or less dif-
ferent ways. In fact, given that episodic remembering need not be fully accurate to 
count as remembering, so that it is compatible with a certain amount of modifica-
tion of the remembered event, and given that much episodic counterfactual think-
ing consists not in imagining wholly novel events but rather in modifying aspects 
of past events, in some cases it may be indeterminate whether the subject is engaged 
in episodic remembering or episodic counterfactual thinking. Episodic counter-
factual thought, of course, does not presuppose a causal connection between the 
subject’s current representation and his previous experience of the event, simply 
because counterfactual events (by definition) did not occur, or did not occur as 
represented. Given the fluidity of the boundary between episodic memory and epi-
sodic counterfactual thought, it becomes difficult to justify imposing the causal 
condition on remembering.
Now, this first path to the rejection of the causal theory risks being question- 
begging in the current context, since it requires us to grant that there is no qualita-
tive distinction between episodic memory and other forms of episodic imagination, 
which is precisely the matter at issue in the debate between continuists and discon-
tinuists. The second path from empirical memory research to the rejection of the 
causal theory avoids this difficulty (see Sutton and Michaelian [forthcoming] for a 
more detailed version of this argument). Both continuists and discontinuists ought 
to accept the basic lesson of constructive memory research: remembering is never 
a matter of simply retrieving a stored “copy” of an experience but is always to some 
extent reconstructive, where reconstruction implies, inter alia, the inclusion, in the 
“retrieved” memory representation, of information not originating in the subject’s 
experience of the target episode. Call the inclusion of such information supplemen-
tation. Is the occurrence of supplementation compatible with satisfaction of the 
causal condition? One might argue that the causal condition can be satisfied in 
cases of supplementation, as long as the retrieved representation does not include 
too much information originating in sources other than the subject’s experience 
of the target episode:  some degree of supplementation is compatible with genu-
ine remembering; only in cases where supplementation results in the inclusion of 
too much information originating in such sources does remembering fail to occur 
(Michaelian, 2011). One obvious difficulty with this position is its vagueness: How 
much supplementation is too much? Setting this difficulty aside, though, the posi-
tion attempts to draw a distinction where none is to be found. The process that is 
at work when the subject, in an attempt to remember a given past episode, con-
structs a representation that includes a large fraction of information originating in 
her experience of the episode is not distinct, at the neurocognitive level, from the 
process that is at work when she constructs a representation that includes only a 
small fraction of information originating in her experience of the episode; nor is it 
distinct from the process that is at work when she constructs a representation that 
includes no information whatsoever originating in her experience of the episode. 
If no information originating in her experience of the episode is preserved, the 
causal condition is not satisfied. Thus the constructive character of remembering 
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rules out the claim that genuine, as opposed to merely apparent, remembering pre-
supposes satisfaction of the causal condition. Again, the causal condition does not 
provide an adequate account of the “something else” distinguishing genuine from 
merely apparent memory, and discontinuists should not appeal to the causal theory 
to ground the claim that there is a qualitative metaphysical difference between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT.11
2.2.  Intentional Discontinuities
In short, while there is much more that might be said both for and against the 
causal theory, the ground on which the theory stands at this point is arguably too 
shaky for it to provide significant support for metaphysical discontinuism. Since 
it is at best unclear whether genuinely remembering a past event does require 
a causal connection with the remembered event, we should look elsewhere for 
qualitative descriptive differences between episodic memory and FMTT. Debus 
maintains both that episodic memory involves causal connection to events (the 
positive relation claim) and that it involves awareness of particular events (the 
positive object claim). She maintains, further, that FMTT does not involve causal 
connection to events (the negative relation claim) and that it does not involve 
awareness of particular events (the negative object claim). While the negative 
relation claim is unproblematic, we have seen that there is reason to doubt the 
positive relation claim. Nevertheless, Debus’s argument for metaphysical discon-
tinuism will go through if both object claims are correct. There are reasons to 
doubt each of these claims.
2.2.1.  The Negative Object Claim
If we set aside the negative relation claim, the negative object claim collapses into 
the claim that it is impossible for subjects to represent particular future events. By 
way of argument for this claim, Debus begins by sketching a two- step account of 
what is involved in imagining future events. On her account, imagining a future 
event (e.g., having lunch with a friend next week) involves, first, imagining a gen-
eral type of event (having lunch with a friend) and, second, imaginatively project-
ing that event into the future (next week). She then argues that, given this account, 
imagining a future event never amounts to imagining a particular future event. 
There are two problems with this strategy. First, it does not show that we cannot 
imagine particular future events by employing some other procedure. Second, it 
does not convincingly show that we cannot imagine particular future events by 
employing the two- step procedure.
As far as the first problem goes, it is by no means clear that the procedure 
described by Debus is in fact employed in all cases of FMTT, and other ways of 
engaging in FMTT may enable us to imagine particular future events. For example, 
it would seem to be possible to imagine a future event by, first, remembering a par-
ticular past event and, second, imaginatively projecting that event into the future. 
I might, for example, imagine having lunch with a friend next week by remem-
bering having lunch with him last week and then imagining that event occurring 
next week rather than last week. If this procedure is employed, then, assuming 
that the representation produced by remembering qualifies as a representation of a 
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particular past event, it should arguably not cease to count as a representation of a 
particular event simply because it is projected into the future.
The discontinuist might suggest that the representation does indeed cease to 
count as a representation of a particular event when it is projected into the future 
on the ground that this sort of projection involves imaginative modification of an 
important feature of the event, namely, its temporal location. Taking the counter-
factual dimension of PMTT into account, however, undermines this suggestion. 
Thinking of a particular past event is compatible with imaginatively modifying 
various feature of the event. I might, for example, remember having lunch with a 
friend last week but imagine eating slightly different food. In this case, I am pre-
sumably still thinking of a particular event. I might go further, remembering having 
lunch with a friend but imagining eating in a different restaurant, modifying the 
spatial location of the event. In this case, I may or may not count as being engaged 
in remembering, but I am presumably still thinking of a particular event. If imagi-
natively modifying their spatial locations is compatible with thinking of particu-
lar events, presumably imaginatively modifying their temporal location is as well. 
Nor does it seem to matter whether I modify the temporal location of the event by 
imagining it occurring at a different time in the past or by imagining it occurring in 
the future. I might remember having lunch with a friend last week but imagine the 
lunch occurring somewhat later— closer to the present— than it did. If I then shift 
from episodic counterfactual thought to FMTT and project the event forward into 
the future— say, tomorrow, rather than yesterday— nothing would seem to change, 
as far as the particularity of the event that I am imagining is concerned.
Conceding this point, the discontinuist might argue that the possibility of imag-
ining a particular future event by remembering a particular past event and pro-
jecting it into the future is compatible with the spirit of discontinuism, since one’s 
imagination of a particular future event in such cases is parasitic on one’s memory 
of a particular past event, which might be enough to secure a metaphysical asymme-
try between episodic memory and FMTT. The second problem for Debus’s strategy, 
however, undermines this move. The problem is that, even in cases in which imag-
ining future events employs the original two- step procedure— thinking of a gen-
eral type of event and projecting it into the future— it is unclear whether the agent 
necessarily fails to imagine a particular future event. As Debus admits, whether 
one can, by means of this procedure, imagine a particular event may depend on 
how we individuate events. If events are individuated in a thin manner, simply by 
reference to spatiotemporal location, the procedure clearly enables subjects to think 
of particular future events. There is no barrier to imagining a general type of event 
occurring at a given spatiotemporal location.
Debus’s argument thus presupposes a thicker way of individuating events. If 
events are individuated in a slightly thicker manner, say, by reference to the partic-
ular agents they involve, in addition to spatiotemporal location, the procedure still 
enables subjects to think of particular future events. There is no barrier to imagin-
ing a general type of event occurring at a given spatiotemporal location and involv-
ing given people. We might suspect that, if events are individuated in a maximally 
thick manner, as fully determinate, concrete entities, the procedure will not enable 
subjects to think of particular future events, since imagination of a general type 
of event will necessarily fail to capture the full richness of the real, concrete event. 
At this point, however, the question of event individuation starts to look like a red 
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herring. Regardless of how events are individuated, one need not, in order to think 
of a particular past event, recall it in every detail. In many cases, one’s memory for 
past events may in fact be quite schematic. Analogously, one need not, in order to 
think of a particular future event, imagine it in every detail. Of course, if events 
are individuated in a maximally thick manner, detailed representations of future 
events will very often be somewhat inaccurate, simply because there are limits to 
our powers of anticipation. But the same thing goes for detailed representations 
of past events, which are likewise often inaccurate— there are limits to our pow-
ers of recollection, just as there are limits to our powers of anticipation. At least 
within certain limits, inaccuracy need not prevent us from thinking of particular 
past events, or from thinking of particular future events.
The suspicion that the two- step procedure may suffice to allow us to imagine 
particular future events is reinforced by the observation that, in many cases, the 
very same procedure is employed in episodic memory:  in many cases, remem-
bering a past event amounts precisely to imagining a general type of event and 
imaginatively projecting it into the past. Consider memory for frequently repeated 
events. In many such cases, one retains little information from any particular rep-
etition of the event, but one does retain a general representation of the event type. 
Remembering a particular repetition of the event may amount to forming a repre-
sentation of the event type and imaginatively projecting it back to the relevant past 
time. If remembering can put us in contact with particular events when it employs 
this procedure, then so, presumably, can imagining. Of course, a discontinuist 
might suggest that, in cases where remembering employs this procedure, it does not 
count as genuinely episodic remembering (i.e., that it does not in fact involve repre-
senting a particular past event). But this suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the 
reconstructive character of episodic memory, which routinely draws both on infor-
mation originating in experience of particular events and on generic knowledge, 
including scripts for common event types. In fact, as several of the contributions to 
this volume make clear (Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, Chapter 2; Klein & Steindam, 
Chapter 7; Irish, Chapter 19), both PMTT and FMTT may in some cases depend 
exclusively on semantic knowledge. Alternatively, the discontinuist might grant 
that remembering sometimes employs the two- step procedure but suggest that it 
counts as genuinely episodic remembering only if there is a shift from projecting a 
general type of event to a past time to thinking of a particular event, strictly under-
stood. But any plausible explanation of what such a shift might consist in is likely to 
invoke the causal criterion, and, as we have seen, there are independent problems 
for that criterion.
In light of these two problems for Debus’s strategy, the discontinuist might look 
for another means of motivating the negative object claim. Rather than motivating 
it by appealing to the nature of representations of future events, the discontinuist 
might attempt to motivate it by appealing to the nature of future events them-
selves, arguing that we cannot represent particular future events simply because 
there is no such thing as a future event. This alternative strategy attempts to base a 
metaphysical asymmetry between episodic memory and FMTT on a metaphysical 
asymmetry between the past and the future, invoking an indeterminist metaphys-
ics according to which, while there is a matter of fact about what happened in the 
past, there is no determinate matter of fact about what will happen in the future. 
While such an approach would provide no guarantee that we are able to think of 
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particular past events, it would guarantee that we are unable to think of particular 
future events and so would constitute a step toward metaphysical discontinuism.
This alternative strategy is not a particularly promising means of motivating the 
negative object claim. First, the metaphysical openness of the future is a contro-
versial matter (Debus, Chapter 11 of this volume); the strategy is thus risky, as it 
depends on the outcome of an ongoing debate in the metaphysics of time. Second, 
the strategy seems to miss the point. What matters, in the debate between con-
tinuists and discontinuists, is not the metaphysical openness of the future but rather 
its cognitive openness. Discontinuism becomes no less plausible if we suppose that 
metaphysical determinism is true: even if the future is metaphysically closed, the 
discontinuist can maintain that it is cognitively open and that we therefore cannot 
enter into cognitive contact with particular future events. By the same token, the 
continuist can maintain that, even if the past is metaphysically closed, it is cogni-
tively open (since our knowledge of the past is limited) and that we therefore cannot 
enter into cognitive contact with particular past events. Invoking a metaphysical 
asymmetry between the past and the future is thus unlikely to provide adequate 
support for a metaphysical asymmetry between past- and future- oriented MTT.
2.2.2.  The Positive Object Claim
While the considerations raised in the previous section cast doubt on the negative 
object claim, according to which we are unable to imagine particular future events, 
they do not establish that we are in fact able to imagine particular future events. If 
it should turn out that we are unable to imagine particular future events, the dis-
continuist might fall back on the positive object claim, according to which we are 
able to remember particular past events, to motivate metaphysical discontinuism. 
Thus our assessment of the case for metaphysical discontinuism requires an exami-
nation of the case for the positive object claim. This section argues that, while the 
discussion so far has taken for granted that we are able to remember particular past 
events, there is a real possibility that the positive object claim is false (i.e., that we 
are unable to imagine particular past events).
In order to make a case for the claim that episodic memory puts the subject in 
contact with particular past events, Debus appeals to her relational account of 
memory (Debus, 2008). In addition to the positive relation claim (discussed ear-
lier), the relational account includes the claim that, when a subject remembers, 
the remembered event itself is (part of) the content of her memory. The relational 
account thus amounts to a form of direct realism about the objects of memory 
(hence Debus cites Reid 1764 as a precursor of her view).12 In view of the serious 
problems facing direct realism, the relational account can provide little support for 
the positive object claim.
The distinction between direct and indirect (or representative) realism has been 
most extensively discussed in the philosophy of perception. The direct realist about 
perception claims that, in perceiving, what the subject is related to in the first 
instance is an external object. The indirect realist, in contrast, claims that what the 
subject is related to in the first instance is an internal representation; the subject 
counts as seeing the external object when his internal representation is related to 
it in the right way. Because it posits internal representations that function as inter-
mediaries between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, the story told by 
indirect realism about the nature of perception is more complicated than that told 
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by direct realism. But there is a powerful motivation for the introduction of this 
additional complexity, in the form of the argument from illusion, which motivates 
the introduction of internal representations by pointing out that perception is not 
always veridical.
In cases of hallucination, for example, the subject “sees” something that is not 
in fact there. Veridical perception seems to have something important in common 
with hallucination; in principle, after all, hallucination might be indistinguishable, 
from the subject’s perspective, from veridical perception. Direct realism, since it 
views perception in terms of a direct relation between subject and object, has dif-
ficulty accounting for this fact. Indirect realism, in contrast, can accommodate 
it without difficulty, since it can point to the internal representation as the factor 
common to veridical perception and hallucination. The upshot is that direct realists 
are forced to adopt a “disjunctive” view of perception: veridical perception and hal-
lucination are not two kinds of perception; only veridical perception is perception; 
hallucination is another kind of state entirely.
The direct realist about memory claims that, in remembering, what the subject is 
related to in the first instance is a past event. The indirect realist, in contrast, claims 
that what the subject is related to in the first instance is an internal representation; 
the subject counts as remembering a past event when his internal representation is 
related to it in the right way. Just as indirect realism about perception can be moti-
vated by an argument from perceptual illusion, indirect realism about memory 
can be motivated by an argument from memory illusions— distorted or inaccurate 
memories. In the case of “memory hallucinations” (i.e., wholly false memories), the 
subject “remembers” an event that did not in fact occur. Accurate memory seems 
to have something important in common with memory hallucination; in principle, 
memory hallucination might be indistinguishable, from the subject’s perspective, 
from accurate memory. And just as direct realism about perception has difficulty 
accommodating perceptual hallucination, direct realism about memory has dif-
ficulty accommodating memory hallucination. Indirect realism about memory, in 
contrast, can accommodate it without difficulty, since it can point to the memory 
representation as the factor common to accurate memory and memory hallucina-
tion. The upshot is that, just as direct realists about perception are forced to adopt 
a disjunctive view of perception, direct realists about memory are forced to adopt a 
disjunctive view of memory: accurate memory and memory hallucination are not 
two kinds of memory; only accurate memory is memory; memory hallucination is 
another sort of state entirely.
Though it has its defenders, disjunctivism is implausible not only from an intui-
tive but also from a naturalistic perspective. From a naturalistic perspective, we 
should not draw distinctions between mental states or processes where none is to 
be found at the neurocognitive level; this is precisely what disjunctivism requires 
us to do. One way to see this is to note that, just as direct realism implies disjunc-
tivism, it implies factivity: as Debus puts it, “a subject could not possibly have an 
[episodic memory] of an event that did not take place” (2008, 410). As noted earlier, 
it is a commonplace in philosophy that memory is factive, but factivity is empiri-
cally untenable. At the neurocognitive level, there need be no qualitative differ-
ence between the process at work when the episodic construction system produces 
a wholly inaccurate representation of a past event and the process at work when 
the system produces an accurate representation of a past event. It is tempting to 
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suppose that there must be at least some quantitative difference, such as greater 
fluency in the case of accurate memory than in the case of memory hallucination 
(Perrin, Chapter 3 of this volume), but there need not be even a quantitative differ-
ence. A counterfactual event that has been frequently imagined, for example, might 
be remembered just as fluently as an experienced event (Loftus, 1996). Factivity— 
and disjunctivism— should thus be rejected.13
Since direct realism about perception entails disjunctivism, it encounters an 
analogous objection. But direct realism about memory also faces a problem that is 
not shared by direct realism about perception. The objects of perception are present 
(i.e., they are contemporaneous with the perceiving subject); hence, setting aside 
disjunctivism, it is relatively easy to understand how they might form part of the 
content of the subject’s perceptual states. The objects of episodic memory, in con-
trast, are in the past; hence it is much more difficult to understand how they might 
form part of the content of the subject’s memories. The memory exists now; the 
event does not; how, then, might the latter be part of the content of the former? 
One possibility here is to invoke mnemic causation (Russell, 1921), the idea that 
past events can be direct causes of our present memories of them. Were the notion 
of mnemic causation legitimate, it might provide the sort of direct connection 
between present representations and past events needed to allow the latter to con-
stitute part of the former. The problem, of course, is that the notion of causation at a 
temporal distance is borderline unintelligible (Bernecker, 2008), and hence relying 
on it to save direct realism would be a desperate move.
While this brief discussion cannot provide a decisive case against the disjunctiv-
ism entailed by direct realism, we have at least good prima facie reason to reject 
the positive object claim, if it is understood along the direct realist lines suggested 
by Debus. The alternative is to understand it along indirect realist lines, as saying 
that remembering puts subjects in contact with particular past events by means of 
internal representations that are appropriately related to those events. As we saw 
earlier, however, if we understand the negative object claim in the same way, there 
is little reason to think that imagination does not put subjects in contact with par-
ticular future events. In sum, neither Debus’s object claims nor her relation claims 
go through, and her argument does not establish metaphysical discontinuism.
2.3.  Phenomenological Discontinuities
If the argument so far is on track, neither causal nor intentional considerations 
establish metaphysical discontinuism. The possibility remains that there are quali-
tative phenomenological discontinuities between episodic memory and FMTT. 
Perrin (Chapter 3 of this volume) claims to identify two such discontinuities, one 
concerning the role of autonoesis, the form of consciousness characteristic of MTT, 
and one concerning the mechanisms respectively responsible for the production 
of autonoesis in episodic memory and FMTT. This section discusses these alleged 
phenomenological discontinuities in turn.
2.3.1.  The Role of Autonoesis
Continuists maintain that autonoesis plays essentially the same role in FMTT as it 
does in episodic memory— conferring a sense of “mineness,” or ownership, on an 
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episodic representation, a sense that the represented event belongs to the subject’s 
own personal past or personal future (as opposed to the life of some other subject 
or possibly of no one in particular). Perrin argues that this is a mistake. While 
he grants that FMTT, like episodic memory, draws on content originating in the 
subject’s own experiences, he argues that the fact that FMTT draws on experien-
tial content does not guarantee the involvement of autonoetic consciousness in the 
process. He points out, in particular, that a subject might, while drawing on the 
very same experiential content, switch back and forth between imagining his own 
future experience and imagining a future experience belonging to another subject. 
Only in the former case will the subject enjoy autonoetic consciousness; the latter 
case will involve a different sort of phenomenology. Thus Perrin seeks to drive a 
wedge between autonoetic consciousness and mere episodic subjectivity:  the lat-
ter, unlike the former, “does not imply the identity of the self who is episodically 
thinking with the self whose experience is being thought about” (Perrin, Chapter 3 
of this volume). If this is right, then autonoetic consciousness is not a necessary 
component of FMTT, whereas it is a necessary component of episodic memory.14
Given that autonoesis is distinct from chronesthesia— with autonoesis refer-
ring specifically to consciousness of the self in subjective time and chronesthesia 
referring to consciousness of subjective time more broadly (Tulving, 2002)— the 
continuist should admit that autonoesis is not intrinsic to episodic cognition. The 
involvement of experiential content in FMTT does not imply the involvement of 
autonoesis, and for precisely the reason that Perrin identifies: FMTT enables the 
subject to imagine not only his own future experiences, but also those of other 
subjects. Situating episodic memory as one form of PMTT, however, it is clear that 
the same thing goes for PMTT. The involvement of experiential content in PMTT 
does not imply the involvement of autonoesis, for precisely the same reason: PMTT 
enables the subject to imagine not only his own past experiences (i.e., to remember), 
but also to imagine those of other subjects.
At this point, the discontinuist might retreat from broad to narrow discon-
tinuism, restricting the scope of the claim about the role of autonoesis to episodic 
memory in particular, as opposed to PMTT as a whole, to argue that episodic mem-
ory necessarily involves autonoesis, while FMTT and other forms of PMTT do not. 
But there are two problems with this move. First, even disregarding the question of 
the status of animal “episodic- like” memory (on which see, e.g., Thom & Clayton, 
Chapter  14 of this volume; Martin- Ordas, Chapter  15 of this volume; Corballis, 
Chapter 16 of this volume), it is not in fact clear whether episodic memory neces-
sarily involves autonoesis. There are, for example, cases of subjects who have intact 
episodic memory, in the sense that they are able to construct detailed representa-
tions of events from the personal past, despite suffering from impaired autonoesis, 
in the sense that they do not feel as if the events in question belong to them (e.g., 
Klein & Nichols 2012).
This does not provide an open- and- shut case against the move; for example, the 
discontinuist might maintain that autonoesis is necessarily involved in ordinary, 
non- pathological cases of episodic memory, but the second problem comes into 
play at this point. Even if we grant that episodic memory does necessarily involve 
autonoesis, Perrin’s argument asks us to compare apples and oranges— or rather to 
compare a single apple selected from basket of varied apples to a whole basket of 
varied oranges. There are multiple forms of FMTT and multiple forms of PMTT. 
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Thus it is illegitimate to select one form of PMTT (namely, episodic memory), point 
out that it has a certain phenomenological feature, note that some forms of FMTT 
lack that phenomenological feature, and argue on that basis for an asymmetry 
between episodic memory and FMTT. Since there are multiple forms of FMTT and 
PMTT, what the discontinuist needs to show is that the particular form of FMTT 
that corresponds to the particular form of PMTT in question— episodic memory— 
lacks or can lack the phenomenology characteristic of that form of PMTT. And 
there is no reason to think that it does or can:  when I  imagine an event of my 
personal future, the event seems to belong to me, just as remembered events do. 
There may be subtle phenomenological differences between MTT into the personal 
future and episodic memory, stemming from the greater uncertainty of the future. 
But the fact that I cannot be sure whether an anticipated event will actually occur 
as represented does not imply that I cannot be sure that I am the person at issue 
in my representation of the event, just as the fact that I cannot be sure whether a 
remembered event actually occurred as represented does not imply that I cannot 
be sure that I am the person at issue in my representation of the event.15 Moreover, 
episodic memory is not the only form of PMTT to involve autonoetic conscious-
ness, since the latter is also involved in episodic counterfactual thought; and any 
phenomenological difference between MTT into the personal future is unlikely to 
be greater than the phenomenological difference between episodic memory and 
episodic counterfactual thought.
2.3.2. Mechanisms of Autonoesis
The second apparent discontinuity identified by Perrin concerns not the role 
but rather the production of autonoesis, specifically, the mechanism that brings 
autonoetic consciousness into play in a given episodic constructive process. He 
argues, first, that, in episodic memory, autonoesis is the result of an automatic, 
subpersonal- level monitoring process (roughly, a type 1 process), suggesting that 
it derives from the detection of certain features of the first- order episodic simula-
tion process, perhaps its fluency. Due to its automatic, subpersonal- level charac-
ter, autonoesis is impenetrable to belief in cases of episodic memory: even if one 
reflectively concludes that the represented event does not in fact belong to one’s 
personal past, one will continue to feel as if it does. He argues, second, that, in 
FMTT, autonoesis (when it occurs) is the result of a deliberate, personal- level pro-
cess (roughly, a type 2 process); for example, one might anticipate the occurrence 
of a certain event and infer, on the basis of semantic knowledge, that one will par-
ticipate in the event in a given role. Due to its deliberate, personal- level character, 
autonoesis is penetrable to beliefs in cases of FMTT: if one concludes that the rep-
resented event does not in fact belong to one’s personal future, one will cease to feel 
as if it does.
The first part of this argument is plausible. Given that other forms of PMTT can 
be just as fluent as episodic memory, the monitoring process is likely to rely on 
multiple factors, rather than fluency alone, but the production of autonoesis in epi-
sodic remembering might indeed result from a subpersonal- level monitoring pro-
cess. The second part of the argument is much less plausible. On the one hand, if it 
were indeed possible for a personal- level process to generate autonoesis in the case 
of FMTT, the same process could in principle be responsible for generating autono-
esis in the case of PMTT, including episodic memory. It is unclear, however, how a 
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personal- level process might, in either case, result in the sort of primitive phenom-
enal state that autonoesis is generally taken to be. On the other hand, it is by no 
means clear that a subpersonal- level monitoring process could not be responsible 
for generating autonoesis in the case of FMTT. Whatever factors such a monitoring 
process might draw on in the case of episodic memory will also be available in the 
case of FMTT. Fluency alone will not discriminate perfectly between representa-
tions of one’s own future experiences and those of other subjects, but neither does 
it discriminate perfectly between representations of one’s own past experiences 
and those of other subjects.16 Moreover, an account that posits two distinct mecha-
nisms, one responsible for generating autonoesis in the case of PMTT, the other 
responsible for generating autonoesis in the case of FMTT, is unparsimonious; if an 
account positing a single mechanism is available, it is to be preferred. On the whole, 
then, it is possible that a subpersonal- level mechanism generates autonoesis in the 
case of episodic memory, while a personal- level mechanism generates autonoesis in 
the case of FMTT, but the more likely possibility is that a subpersonal- level mecha-
nism is at work in both cases.
In short, neither of the apparent phenomenological discontinuities between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT identified by Perrin appears to be bona fide. Overall, the 
case for metaphysical discontinuism is weak.
3.  AGAINST EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISCONTINUISM
If metaphysical discontinuism is incorrect, epistemological discontinuism is 
unlikely to be correct. Nevertheless, it is worth looking separately, if more briefly, 
at arguments for epistemological discontinuism. Even if metaphysical discon-
tinuism is correct, epistemological discontinuism might turn out to be incorrect, 
since metaphysical discontinuities do not necessarily entail epistemological dis-
continuities. A  discontinuist unconvinced by the considerations raised against 
metaphysical discontinuism in the foregoing thus might still be persuaded to reject 
epistemological discontinuism.
This section therefore discusses possible epistemological discontinuities between 
episodic memory and FMTT, looking at the epistemic openness of the future and 
the past (section 3.1), the directness or indirectness of our knowledge of past and 
future events (section 3.2), and immunity to error through misidentification— or 
the lack thereof— in episodic memory and FMTT (section 3.3).
3.1.  The Epistemic Openness of the Future and the Past
A natural first thought to have about potential epistemological discontinuities 
between episodic memory and FMTT is that, if FMTT can provide us with any 
knowledge of the future at all, that knowledge is bound to be dramatically less 
secure than the knowledge of the past with which we are provided by episodic 
memory. As noted in section 2, the future is cognitively or epistemically open, 
whether or not it is metaphysically open: even if there is a determinate matter of fact 
about what will happen, we cannot be certain about what will happen. We might 
go further: even if there is a determinate matter of fact about what will happen, we 
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cannot be certain that anything at all will happen— no matter how detailed our 
projections, it is entirely consistent with our epistemic situation vis- à- vis the future 
that the entire world will blink out of existence five minutes from now. In con-
trast, one might maintain, even if we cannot be fully certain that the details of our 
memories of past events are accurate, we can at least be certain that the world did 
not blink into existence five minutes ago. The contrast between our inability to rule 
out the unreality of the future and our ability to rule out the unreality of the past 
might thus seem to underwrite a qualitative asymmetry between our knowledge of 
future events and our knowledge of past events.
While this is a natural thought to have, it is mistaken. As Russell (1921) notori-
ously pointed out, we are not in fact able to rule out the unreality of the past. No 
matter how detailed our memories, no matter how subjectively convincing they 
are, it is entirely consistent with our epistemic situation vis- à- vis the past that the 
entire world blinked into existence five minutes ago, complete with our apparent 
memories of past events. This is, of course, just a particular instance of a general 
point about skepticism in epistemology:  if we raise the standards for knowledge 
sufficiently high, requiring not just reliability but certainty, we deprive ourselves of 
virtually all knowledge, including knowledge of the very existence of the external 
world; if certainty is a prerequisite for knowledge, we have knowledge neither of 
past events, nor of future events, nor even of present events. Non- skeptics— and 
that includes virtually all of us— should thus set the standards for knowledge well 
below the level of certainty. And if knowledge presupposes only some lower level 
of reliability, we have no reason (so far) to think that there is a qualitative asym-
metry between our knowledge of past events and our knowledge of future events. 
Our beliefs about future events may well be somewhat less reliable than our beliefs 
about past events, but this gives us a merely quantitative epistemological difference 
between episodic memory and FMTT.
3.2.  Direct and Indirect Knowledge
If a qualitative epistemological difference between episodic memory and FMTT 
cannot be located at the level of reliability, perhaps it can be located elsewhere, 
either in the directness or indirectness of our knowledge of past and future events, 
or in the extent of our indirect knowledge.
3.2.1. Indirect Knowledge
As far as indirect or inferential knowledge goes, our beliefs about the future appear 
to be on a par with our beliefs about the past. Future events are not given but 
inferred, and our knowledge of them thus depends on the reliability of the infer-
ences that we perform, on the basis of the evidence available to us in the present, 
about what is going to happen. But the very same thing goes for our knowledge of 
past events. As Kneale (1971, 11) puts it,
We may … be misled by a truism, that what is past has happened and that 
what is future has not, into the belief that the past is necessarily more acces-
sible for knowledge than the future. After all, it is there and we should be able 
to find out about it. But this does not follow. Past events have happened, but 
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whether they can be known depends upon whether they are connected with 
present events by laws which allow of backward inference, and whether pres-
ent observation, memory, and records provide us with sufficient information 
to apply such laws.
In general, past events are no more given than are future events, and our knowledge 
of them depends on the reliability of the inferences that we perform, on the basis 
of the evidence available to us in the present, about what must have happened. This 
point holds both for systematic, scientific inquiries into the past and the future and 
for episodic simulation of past and future events.
Why, if there is no qualitative difference between our indirect knowledge 
of past events and our indirect knowledge of future events, do we ordinarily 
take ourselves to know much more about the past than we do about the future? 
Kneale suggests that this habit is explained by two broad psychological tenden-
cies. On the one hand, when we think about the past, we tend to focus on what 
we do know. Her examples are primarily historical, but this goes for episodic 
memory as well:  there are whole periods of one’s life about which one remem-
bers little or nothing, but one is normally only dimly aware of these, preferring to 
focus on well- remembered events (“meeting my wife,” “the birth of my child”, . . .), 
as it is the latter that tend to be especially significant. On the other hand, when we 
think about the future, we tend to focus on what we do not know. Again, Kneale’s 
examples are primarily historical, but this goes for FMTT as well: there are many 
future events that one can anticipate in great detail, but one normally focuses on 
especially significant events (“my child leaving home,” “my retirement,” . . .), and 
these are often difficult to envision in any detail.
This explanation might itself be taken to provide an alternative route to an epis-
temological discontinuity between episodic memory and FMTT. Our knowledge of 
the past, the discontinuist might argue, includes a great deal of specific information 
about events, whereas our knowledge of the future consists mostly of information 
about generic, repeated features of events— this is why we know more about the 
personally important events of the past than we do about the personally important 
events of the future. If the claim is merely that we know more about particular 
past events than we do about particular future events, it is probably right but does 
not establish a qualitative difference between episodic memory and FMTT.17 If the 
claim is, more strongly, that, while we can have knowledge of particular past events, 
we cannot have knowledge of particular future events, it is vulnerable to the con-
siderations raised in section 2.2 against Debus’s positive and negative object claims. 
Thus the suggested route does not look promising.
3.2.2. Direct Knowledge
With respect to indirect or inferential knowledge, Kneale argues for continuity 
between our knowledge of the future and our knowledge of the past. With respect 
to direct or non- inferential knowledge, however, she grants that there is a funda-
mental discontinuity between them, in that only memory provides us with direct 
knowledge of events. Indeed, she treats “the capacity to have non- inferential self- 
certifying beliefs about particular matters of fact in the past” as definitive of mem-
ory and argues that “we have no such self- certifying beliefs about the future” (1971, 
1– 2). In this, she is in agreement with a number of other philosophers. Swinburne, 
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for example, argues that “men have memory but not foreknowledge. Their non- 
inferential knowledge is of the past but not of the future” (1966, 167).
While this view has been popular among philosophers, it is not immediately 
clear what it might mean to say that memory is a direct source of knowledge. 
Kneale makes clear that her point is not about reliability: she acknowledges that 
memory is imperfectly reliable and suggests that, even if anticipation were just as 
reliable as memory, it would not count as a direct source of knowledge of the future. 
Ultimately, her point boils down to the claim that it is part of the very concept of 
memory that “the memory event [i.e., the occurrence of remembering] should have 
as a part- cause the occurrence of the event recollected” (Kneale, 1971, 2). Given this 
assumption, as well as the innocuous assumption that causes necessarily precede 
their effects, it follows that we are necessarily unable to “remember the future” (i.e., 
that we are necessarily unable to spontaneously anticipate future events, in parallel 
to the way we spontaneously remember past events). The apparent epistemological 
difference between our knowledge of the past and our knowledge of the future thus 
collapses into the apparent metaphysical difference that provides the basis for the 
causal theory of memory. And, as we saw in section 2.1, while the causal theory is 
intuitively plausible, there is good reason to reject it.
Kneale’s discussion of “direct” memory knowledge is nevertheless instructive, 
in that it provides an important clue to the source of the appeal of the thought 
that there must be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between episodic 
memory and FMTT. Consider her discussion of alleged cases of “pre- cognition” 
(1971, 2):
The pre- cognitions investigated by the Society for Psychical Research do not 
correspond to memories, because the investigator at least, and generally the 
percipient too, regards them as subject to confirmation, and no serious scien-
tist or historian would think of such “precognitions” as providing premises 
for further inferences. … We have no faculty for recognizing truths about the 
future analogous to memory.
The point is not that precognition does not exist. The point— and this is indepen-
dent of the causal theory— is rather that, even if it were to exist, we would be reluc-
tant to regard it as a source of knowledge in the same way that we regard memory as 
a source of knowledge, because it would always be subject to further confirmation. 
Similarly, we can observe that, whereas we regularly treat memory, for example in 
legal contexts, as a more or less decisive source of evidence about what happened, 
we do not have any equivalent practice of treating FMTT as a source of evidence 
about what will happen. More generally, when someone claims to remember the 
occurrence of an event, we often accept his claim at face value, but when someone 
anticipates the occurrence of an event, we normally want additional confirming 
evidence.
There is thus an asymmetry between our epistemic practices with respect to 
episodic memory and our epistemic practices with respect to FMTT. Whether 
this difference at the level of epistemic practice reflects an underlying difference 
of epistemic status is another question. There is good reason to think that it does 
not. Paradoxically, the practical difference seems to arise because confirming or 
disconfirming evidence is often available, at least in principle, at the time at which 
8 4  S E E I N G  T H E   F U T U R E
a subject remembers an event, whereas confirming evidence cannot be available 
at the time at which a subject anticipates an event. The fact that a memory can be 
confirmed at the time at which it occurs reassures us; we are therefore less inclined 
to ask for confirmation. The fact that a prediction cannot be confirmed at the time 
at which it occurs disquiets us; we are therefore more inclined to ask for confirma-
tion. But as far as the epistemic status of the representations respectively produced 
by episodic memory and FMTT are concerned, there may yet be no qualitative dif-
ference between them.
Within a reliabilist framework (e.g., Goldman, 2012)— analogous points can be 
made within most other epistemological frameworks— the epistemic status of a 
representation is determined simply by the reliability of the process that produced 
it. If episodic memory and FMTT are both sufficiently reliable for knowledge, they 
both produce knowledge, even if we have available processes for confirming that we 
have knowledge in the case of episodic memory (e.g., seeking corroborating physi-
cal evidence) and no such process available for confirming that we have knowledge 
in the case of FMTT. The point is that one can know without being in a position to 
know that one knows. When, seeming to remember an event, I ask myself whether 
I know that the event occurred, I often have available some means of answering the 
question. In contrast, when, anticipating an event, I ask myself whether I know that 
the event will occur, I normally have available no means of answering the question. 
But the fact that I cannot know whether I know does not imply that I do not know. 
Our epistemic practices with respect to epistemic memory and FMTT thus sug-
gest at most a difference between our knowledge of our knowledge of the past and 
our knowledge of our knowledge of the future, but this does not entail a difference 
between our knowledge of the past itself and our knowledge of the future itself.
3.3.  Immunity to Error Through Misidentification
Perrin (Chapter 3 of this volume) argues for a final, subtler epistemological dis-
continuity between episodic memory and FMTT:  on his view, FMTT displays 
immunity to error through misidentification, and episodic memory does not. Some 
background is required in order to understand this claim. First, we need the notion 
of error through misidentification. A thought involves an error through misidenti-
fication when it is incorrect due to the fact that it attributes an incorrect identity 
to something or someone. For example, suppose that I hear the phone ring and 
think, “my wife is calling,” when, in reality, it is my colleague who is calling. In this 
case, my thought correctly describes an event— someone really is calling— but it is 
nonetheless incorrect overall because I am mistaken about the identity of one of 
the people involved in the event. Second, we need the notion of immunity to error 
through misidentification. A thought manifests immunity to error through mis-
identification when it is impossible for it to be incorrect due to the fact that it attri-
butes an incorrect identity to something or someone. My thought that my wife is 
calling is, obviously, not immune to error through misidentification. Even thoughts 
about oneself need not be immune to error through misidentification. For example, 
if I mistake my reflection in a mirror for that of a colleague and think “my colleague 
is wearing a sport coat” when in fact I am the one wearing a sport coat, I commit 
an error through misidentification. But certain thoughts about oneself are arguably 
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immune to error through misidentification. For example, if I introspect and think 
“I feel hungry right now,” I arguably cannot be mistaken about the identity of the 
person who feels hunger.
The first part of Perrin’s claim, then, is that when a subject episodically remem-
bers, his thoughts are not immune to error through misidentification: it is possible 
for them to be mistaken due to the fact that they attribute an incorrect identity 
to something or someone. Errors through misidentification in episodic memory 
may result from attributions of incorrect identity to oneself,18 but they may also 
result from attributions of incorrect identity to other subjects. For example, I might 
remember talking to a specific colleague but misidentify him, perhaps because 
I mistook him at the time of the conversation for another colleague. The second 
part of Perrin’s claim is that, when a subject imagines a future episode, her thoughts 
are immune to error through misidentification: it is impossible for them to be mis-
taken due to the fact that they attribute an incorrect identity to something or some-
one. The thought here is that, when, for example, I imagine talking to a colleague 
tomorrow, I cannot attribute an incorrect identity to the colleague in question. One 
cannot be mistaken about the identities of the entities involved in imagined events, 
simply because the identities of the entities one imagines are wholly determined 
by one’s intentions. In contrast, one can be mistaken about the identities of the 
entities involved in remembered events, because the identities of the entities one 
remembers are not wholly determined by one’s intentions. This is due to the fact 
that episodic memory is “world- involving” (Recanati, 2007):  the content of one’s 
memory is partly determined by one’s interactions with the world.
Faced with this argument, the epistemological continuist has three options: first, 
he might maintain that neither episodic memory nor FMTT is immune to error 
through misidentification; second, he might maintain that both episodic memory 
and FMTT are immune to error through misidentification; third, he might main-
tain that some instances of episodic memory and some instances of FMTT are 
immune to error through misidentification, while others are not. Given the charac-
terizations of FMTT and episodic memory developed in previous sections, the last 
option seems likely to be correct.
Might some instances of FMTT fail to be immune to error through misidentifi-
cation? We have already seen why it is plausible to hold that error through misiden-
tification is possible in episodic memory: one’s past interactions with the entities 
involved in the events that one remembers affect the content of one’s memories, 
with the consequence that one’s own judgement about the identities of the enti-
ties involved in the events that one remembers may be mistaken. The same line 
of thought, however, suggests that error through misidentification is possible 
in FMTT. As noted in section 2, one may imagine a future event by remember-
ing a past event and imaginatively projecting that event into the future. In such 
cases, one clearly imagines events involving entities with which one has previously 
interacted. Even when one imagines more novel events, one often imagines events 
involving entities with which one has previously interacted, and if previous interac-
tions suffice to fix identity in cases of episodic memory, they presumably do so as 
well in cases of FMTT. Consider again a case in which I imagine talking to a specific 
colleague tomorrow. While it is natural to suppose that my intentions determine 
the identity of the colleague in question (that I  effectively stipulate his identity), 
this need not be the case. Episodic memory is world- involving, if it is, because the 
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subject has causally interacted with the entities involved in his memories; those 
past causal interactions can arguably partly determine the content of his memory 
representations. But the same mechanism allows FMTT to be world- involving: if 
the subject imagines a conversation with a person with whom she has interacted in 
the past, the past causal interaction arguably determines the identity of the person 
of whom she is thinking. Thus when I imagine a conversation with a specific col-
league, I might be mistaken about the identity of the colleague in question, per-
haps because I  mistook him during our past interactions for another colleague. 
If this is right, then in at least some cases FMTT is not immune to error through 
misidentification.19
This argument only shows that some instances of FMTT are not immune to 
error through misidentification; if other instances of FMTT are immune to error 
through misidentification and no instances of episodic memory are immune to 
error through misidentification, the discontinuist can maintain that there is an 
important epistemological asymmetry between episodic memory and FMTT. But 
might some instances of episodic memory be immune to error through misiden-
tification? Perrin’s argument tacitly assumes that episodic memory always satisfies 
the factivity constraint:  genuine memory is always memory of events that actu-
ally occurred. But we saw in section 2 that memory of events that did not actu-
ally occur has just as much claim to be genuine memory as memory of events that 
actually occurred (i.e., that episodic memory does not always satisfy the factivity 
constraint). In cases where the factivity constraint is not satisfied, the subject need 
not have interacted with the entities involved in the event he remembers. Thus there 
are no causal interactions available to fix the identities of those entities, and their 
identities are presumably fixed by the subject’s intentions: just as, when I imagine 
a wholly novel future event, my intentions determine the identities of the things 
and persons involved, when I remember a wholly novel past event, my intentions 
determine the identities of the things and persons involved.
Thus it appears that both parts of Perrin’s claim are to be rejected. It is not the 
case that, when a subject episodically remembers, his thoughts are never immune 
to error through misidentification; in some cases, they may not be, but in other 
cases they may be. And it is not the case that, when a subject imagines a future epi-
sode, his thoughts are always immune to error through misidentification; in some 
cases, they may be, but in other cases they may not be. In short, episodic memory 
and FMTT appear to be on a par, as far as immunity to error through misidentifica-
tion is concerned.
4.  TOWARD A POSITIVE CASE  
FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONTINUISM
This chapter has largely been devoted to responding to the available arguments 
for metaphysical and epistemological continuism. Supposing that the response has 
been successful in undermining those arguments, should we move to metaphysi-
cal and epistemological continuism? The focus of positive continuist arguments 
thus far has been on metaphysical continuism, with psychologists and philosophers 
appealing to MTT research to support a picture of remembering the past and imag-
ining the future as qualitatively similar constructive processes. What remains to be 
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provided, then, is a positive case for epistemological continuism, the view that our 
knowledge of future events is qualitatively similar to our knowledge of past events.
Such a case may be less difficult to develop than one might initially suspect. 
Against the background of metaphysical continuism, Michaelian (2016) develops a 
reliabilist account of our knowledge of past events, arguing that episodic memory 
provides reliable access to the personal past despite its simulational character. The 
account involves two core ideas: first, that mental simulation of past events is gov-
erned by reliable heuristics; second, that the threat of unreliability introduced by 
the simulational character of remembering is further reduced by reliable metacog-
nitive monitoring. It may be possible to extend this account to our knowledge of 
future events in a straightforward manner. Once we give up the idea that remem-
bering necessarily involves a causal connection to the relevant past event (i.e., the 
causal theory) and the idea that remembering puts us in direct contact with the 
relevant past event (i.e., direct realism), it becomes clear that memory knowledge, 
in line with other forms of indirect, inferential knowledge, is underwritten entirely 
by the reliability of the process of remembering. FMTT, of course, involves nei-
ther a causal connection to nor direct contact with the relevant future event, which 
suggests that here, too, knowledge is underwritten entirely by the reliability of the 
process of imagining. Thus our knowledge of the personal future need pose no 
special epistemological challenge: we acquire knowledge of future events, just as we 
acquire knowledge of past events, through reliable simulation and reliable meta-
cognitive monitoring.
Such a reliabilist account of our knowledge of the personal future dovetails nicely 
with recent responses to the charge that imagination is “epistemically irrelevant” 
(Kind, forthcoming) (cf. Balcerak Jackson, forthcoming). As Kind points out, 
philosophers such as Sartre (1948) and Wittgenstein (1980) have argued that the 
imagination is fundamentally epistemically irrelevant:  while it can play an inci-
dental role in the generation of knowledge, for example by leading us to formulate 
hypotheses which can then be verified by other means, it cannot itself generate new 
knowledge. Kind identifies three assumptions that have been used to ground this 
conclusion: first, imagination is typically under our voluntary control; second, it 
is not world- sensitive, in the sense that “its content is determined by the imaginer, 
not by the world”; third, imagination is uninformative, in the sense that “an act of 
imagining can provide us with no new information.”
Kind grants the first two assumptions, but argues that they do not imply that 
imagination cannot aim at the truth. The epistemological continuist might also 
challenge the first two assumptions more directly. As far as the first assumption 
is concerned, much FMTT is spontaneous or involuntary (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 
2008). As far as the second assumption is concerned, this amounts to a version of 
the claim that FMTT is not world- involving, and we have already seen that this 
claim can be challenged. But Kind focuses her resistance to the charge of epistemic 
irrelevance on the third assumption, arguing that imagination can indeed provide 
the imaginer with new information. The thought behind the third assumption is 
that a representation produced by imagination does not contain anything that the 
imaginer did not put into it, which suggests that it cannot provide him with new 
information. Kind points out that this is simply mistaken. A computer program, 
for example, contains nothing that the programmer did not put into it, and yet 
it can of course provide new information when it is run. The same thing goes for 
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imagination: in episodic imagination, one simulates an event, but the simulation 
can provide one with new information. Consider, for example, the case of mind 
reading or theory of mind: when one simulates the mental states of another subject, 
the simulation contains nothing that one did not put into it, but can nevertheless, 
assuming that the simulation process is reliable, provide one with new information 
about the target’s mental states. Similarly, when one simulates one’s own possible 
future experience, the simulation will contain nothing that one did not put into it, 
but can nevertheless, assuming that the simulation process is reliable, provide one 
with new information about those experiences.
This is only a sketch of a positive account, but it is enough to suggest that the 
reliabilist explanation of how episodic memory provides us with knowledge of past 
events can be extended to explain how FMTT provides us with knowledge of future 
events.20 The future of continuism about our knowledge of past and future events 
thus looks bright.
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NOTES
 1. Debus formulates her view in terms of “recollective memory” and “sensory imagi-
nation of future events,” but these terms map onto “episodic memory” and “future- 
oriented mental time travel.”
 2. Similarities and differences at the phenomenological level have also been impor-
tant in MTT research; possible phenomenological discontinuities between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT are discussed at length in section 2.3.
 3. And ignoring Reid’s direct realism; see section 2.2 on direct versus indirect theo-
ries of memory.
 4. Debus (2014), for example, argues that her discontinuist view is compatible with 
essentially all empirical MTT research.
 5. One might also argue for a functional discontinuity, suggesting that the function 
of episodic memory is to provide information that can be recombined to permit 
the simulation of possible future events, the latter being the function of FMTT. If 
this view of the respective functions of episodic memory and FMTT were accu-
rate, it would indeed support a difference in kind between them. But the argument 
depends on an equivocation, treating episodic memory as a store— a source of raw 
materials for the simulation of episodes— and FMTT as a process that draws on 
the materials provided by episodic memory to simulate events. Bearing in mind 
the distinction between episodic memory (understood as a store) and episodic 
remembering (understood as a process), it is equally plausible to suggest that the 
function of episodic memory is to provide information that can be recombined to 
permit the simulation of past events, either counterfactual past events, in episodic 
counterfactual thinking, or actual past events, in episodic remembering. As far 
as functional considerations go, then, the fact that episodic memory provides raw 
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materials for the simulation of possible future events does not support an asym-
metry between episodic remembering and FMTT. There is, moreover, a case to 
be made against the view that there is a dedicated store of episodic information. 
Klein (2015), in particular, argues that what makes a form of cognition episodic 
is a feature at the level of phenomenology, rather than information or content, 
namely, the involvement of autonoetic consciousness. If there is no dedicated epi-
sodic store, the functional argument does not get going in the first place.
 6. The initial stages of the discussion employ the language of representations; for 
reasons given later in this chapter, Debus herself rejects this language.
 7. Debus claims that experiential awareness supervenes on these factors. As philoso-
phers use the notion of supervenience, experiential awareness will supervene on 
previous experience and causal connection just in case there can be no difference 
at the level of experiential awareness without a corresponding difference at the 
level of previous experience and causal connection. Debus resists the claim that 
experiential awareness reduces to these factors. Whether the latter claim is actually 
stronger than the former— i.e., whether supervenience is sufficient for reduction— 
is a technical question with which we need not be concerned here.
 8. The qualification that causation must occur “in the right way” is required to 
cope with deviant causal chains, a problem that need not concern us here; see 
Michaelian (2011) for background.
 9. Both paths assume that the causal link supposed to be characteristic of genuine 
remembering is an informational link, that is, that the causal connection between 
the retrieved memory representation and the original experience goes via stored 
information deriving from the experience. In principle, the causal theorist might 
deny this assumption, but it is not clear that a non- informational characterization 
of non- deviant causal chains can be given.
 10. What sort of account is available, if this picture is right? One possibility worth 
exploring is that genuine remembering is distinguished from merely apparent 
remembering simply by the fact that the subject’s episodic construction system 
takes an episode from the subject’s actual personal past, as opposed to the personal 
future or the counterfactual personal past, as its target. See Michaelian (2016) for 
discussion of this possibility. Another possibility is that genuine remembering is 
distinguished from merely apparent remembering by the subject’s personal- level 
intentions. See Hoerl (2014) for discussion of this possibility. The remainder of 
the argument of this chapter does not depend on a particular alternative to the 
causal condition as a means of distinguishing between genuine and merely appar-
ent memory.
 11. If the causal theory is incorrect, how can the reliability of remembering be 
explained? This question is taken up in section 4.
 12. As noted earlier, this means that it is misleading to describe Debus’s view using the 
language of memory representations, as we have been doing so far; but nothing in 
the foregoing argument depends on this.
 13. As far as the distinction between genuine and merely apparent memory is con-
cerned, the rejection of factivity implies that the distinction rests entirely on the 
second sort of difference between genuine and merely apparent memory that 
rival theories of remembering attempt to capture. Thus it might rest, for example, 
entirely on the aims of the episodic construction system or the subject’s personal- 
level intentions.
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 14. Klein has made a related point; see Klein (2016), Klein & Steindam (Chapter 7 of 
this volume).
 15. Perrin might grant this point, arguing that the difference concerns the source of 
the certainty: FMTT is, and episodic memory is not, immune to error through 
misidentification. This argument is discussed in section 3.
 16. See Michaelian (2012; 2016) for suggestions as to other potential factors that might 
be involved in metacognitive monitoring of episodic construction.
 17. Even if it is right, there may be a chicken- and- egg problem here: To what extent 
do we remember events because they are important to us, and to what extent are 
events important to us because we remember them?
 18. As in hypothetical cases of “quasi- memory,” in which the memories of one subject 
are “transplanted” into another subject (Shoemaker, 1970).
 19. The discontinuist might object that the world- involvingness of FMTT is para-
sitic on that of episodic memory, since it depends on traces laid down during past 
causal interactions— that is, on episodic memories. But this objection depends on 
ignoring the distinction (noted earlier in connection with alleged functional dis-
analogies between episodic memory and FMTT) between memory as a store and 
remembering as a process. As we have seen, the same stored content is employed 
both in episodic remembering and in FMTT; there is no convincing reason to 
assign any priority to the former process, rather than the latter.
 20. An alternative strategy for securing the epistemological continuity of episodic 
memory and FMTT is to grant the epistemic irrelevance of FMTT but to argue 
that episodic memory is also epistemically irrelevant. Hopkins, for example, 
argues that “[i] f in memory we represent the past to ourselves as being a certain 
way, and if representing it so is an action of ours, it seems we can only get the 
past right if we in some way already know how it was. Remembering cannot be 
the source of knowledge of how things were, since it presupposes such knowl-
edge” (2014, 321); this amounts to the suggestion that episodic memory cannot 
provide us with new information. Those who acknowledge the generative, simu-
lational character of remembering will not be tempted to avail themselves of this 
argument.
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